List the Moral and Legal Obligation

List the Moral and Legal Obligation

When you sign a contract, you are required by law to comply with the terms of the contract. Contracts may require you to do things you think are immoral, but they usually can`t force you to break the law. For example, you can`t sign a contract to enslave an employee or kill someone. However, you may waive certain legal rights, such as agreeing to arbitrate any dispute or sign your copyright in a creative work. Respecting parents and teachers, caring for the family and helping those in need are some examples of moral duties while obeying the Constitution, paying taxes honestly and regularly, are examples of legal duties. This may confirm our confidence in the correlative view of the obligation to know that philosophical reflection on political authority has focused from the earliest days on the obligation to obey. The passive obligation to obey is certainly not all we owe to the law (Parekh 1993, 243; Green 2003, 543-47), but many considered it the minimum requirement of the law. This creates a mystery. As Wolff puts it: “If the individual retains his autonomy by reserving the final decision on cooperation in all cases, he thus denies the authority of the state; On the other hand, he submits to the state and accepts his claim to authority, then.

it loses its autonomy” (Wolff 1970, 9). Wolff solves the dilemma in favor of autonomy and defends anarchism on this basis. In such perspectives, we are compelled to obey because it is an appropriate expression of the emotions for which we have good reasons: gratitude to the law for all it gives us, respect for our good faith efforts to guide us, or a sense of community. In the latter case, the relationship cannot be that of a single legal person; it must be something like belonging to the community of which he is right (Raz 1979, 250-61). Friendship offers an analogy. People choose their friends, but not to have obligations to them. However, a flourishing friendship comes with obligations. In addition to the known reasons for fulfilling their duties of support, honesty, reciprocity, etc., it is plausible to assume that this also expresses and is known to express loyalty to one`s friends, and that it further supports duties.

Similarly, Raz suggests: “A person who identifies with his society, feels that it is theirs and that he is part of it, is loyal to his society. Its loyalty can be expressed, inter alia, in compliance with Community law` (1979, 259). This will inevitably be somewhat vaguely – the institutional and bureaucratic structure of the law means that it will generally be an imperfect expression of the society that regulates it. And, as Raz notes, expressive arguments apply only to those who are actually in that particular relationship; They do not show that it is obligatory to do so, nor that it is obligatory to express one`s loyalty in this way and not in any other way. Moreover, it is not clear why we should even think that obedience is an appropriate expression of this type of relationship. Is this a deep-rooted convention? Is that normatively appropriate? Loyalty to one`s friends does not usually manifest itself in obedience to them. Why should community loyalty be different? A moral duty is an obligation based on morality or ethics, while a legal duty is an obligation based on the law of a country. Consent presupposes that obligations of obedience must be contracted in some way through actions whose purpose is to make a commitment. There are weaker forms of voluntarism. Some relationships that can be freely formed (or at least abandoned) are characterized by commitments.

It is essentially a voluntarist version of the theory of constitutive duties discussed above in Section 4.1, and offers the most plausible interpretation of gratitude arguments (Walker, 1988; Klosko 1989) or Community. Moral principles may be prescribed by religious doctrine or derived by rational philosophical reasoning. In some cases, principles such as justice and benevolence simply flow from an intuitive moral sense. Whatever their source, however, these principles are at the heart of ethics. Others claim it regresses the relationship. First, it is doubtful that one can be forced to obey an illegitimate regime. As Rawls puts it, “appropriation or even consent to manifestly unjust institutions does not create obligations” (Rawls 1971, 343; but cf. Simmons 1979, 78-79). If so, at least some conditions of legitimacy precede a commitment to obedience. Second, there is good reason to believe that we would have no obligation to comply if the law did not already have the right to maintain its requirements “with steel.” A legal system that cannot exert justified coercion cannot guarantee to law-abiding people that recalcitrants will not regard them as fools.

Without being able to solve this insurance problem, it would be unfair to impose obligations on them and unfair to demand their obedience. This proposal is based on the well-known idea that effectiveness is a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, condition for a justified authority. (See Kelsen 1967, 46-50; cf. Finnis 1979, 250) We are not legally bound to comply with moral obligations, but we are legally bound to comply with legal obligations. This legalistic and opportunistic attitude is a perfect example of the dangers and, in my opinion, the mistake of trying to separate business ethics from personal ethics. The standards of reliability and honor do not change as soon as you enter the head office. Raz calls this the “normal justification thesis” (NJT). It is fulfilled only if the authority bases its instructions on the reasons that apply to the subjects (the “dependency thesis”) and if the subjects regard their instructions as preventive reasons and suppress their own judgments about what should be done in the matter (the “pre-emption thesis”). Three points deserve to be highlighted. First, a normal justification is not an unambiguous justification, but a typical justification of a variety of practical and theoretical authorities.

Essentially, justified authorities help their subjects to do what they already have good reason to do; It does not apply if it is more important for the subjects to decide for themselves than to decide correctly. Second, while NJT has similarities to rule utilitarianism, it is not a utilitarian theory: it requires additional commitments on what kind of relevant reasons and how indirect policies can be pursued. Third, NJT does not need a valid authority to promote the subject`s self-interest. For example, if there are investments that are immoral (e.g. In countries that tolerate slavery), then an advisor`s recommendations deserve only respect, they distract from these investments: it is not enough (or allows) that they maximize one`s own financial returns. NJT is guided by the reasons that apply to the case, and not by reasons that are known to the representative or that serve his personal interest, which are closely understood. The correlational view of authority commitment is not generally accepted. Some argue that legal authority does not imply a right of reclamation, but only a set of freedoms: to decide certain matters for a society and enforce its decisions. (Soper 2002, 85 ff; cf. Ladenson 1980; Greenawalt, 1987; 47–61; and Edmundson, 1998, pp. 7-70).